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 In Texas v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit vacated an Environmental Protection Agency rule disapproving Texas’s 
State Implementation Plan for compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
under the Clean Air Act.  The court emphasized the importance of the cooperative 
federalism model embodied in the Clean Air Act, wherein the Environmental Protection 
Agency sets air quality standards and each state determines how it will meet those 
standards.  The court held that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
disapproving the plan because disapproval was not based on enforceable statutory 
requirements of the Clean Air Act.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The State of Texas and several industry petitioners challenged a 2010 EPA ruling 
disapproving Texas’s 1994 State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) revision.1  The revision 
proposed a Flexible Permit Program (“Program”) as a new feature of the State’s Minor 
New Source Review (“NSR”) scheme.2  Under the Program, a facility could avoid 
regulatory review for modifications if it obtained a permit providing for a cap on 
aggregate emissions of the permittee.3  In its decision, the Fifth Circuit examined the 
three reasons the EPA articulated for disapproving the SIP:  1) The Program left a 
potential loophole through which major sources could evade NSR requirements; 2) the 
                                                
1 Texas v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 690 F.3d 670, 676 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2012).  
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting (MRR) requirements were inadequate; and 3) 
the proposed method of calculating emissions under the Program lacked clarity and was 
not replicable.4  The Fifth Circuit found the EPA’s decision regarding each reason to be 
arbitrary and capricious and/or in excess of the agency’s statutory authority.5 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 In 1994, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) revised the 
Minor NSR portion of its SIP for compliance with the emission-control requirements of 
the Clean Air Act (CAA).6  The CAA distinguishes major pollution sources from minor 
pollution sources based on whether facilities emit more than a pre-identified amount of a 
pollutant.7  The Program allowed facilities classified under the Minor NSR scheme to 
obtain pre-construction approval for permits as long as the added emissions would not 
exceed an aggregate limit.8   
 Between 1994 and 2008, the EPA failed to issue a final decision approving or 
disapproving the Texas revision.9  During that time, the TCEQ adopted the Program and 
began issuing permits.10  The Texas legislature also incorporated the revision into the 
Texas Clean Air Act.11  In 2008, industry groups brought a mandatory duty suit in federal 
district court to force the EPA to either adopt or reject the Program.12  The suit resulted in 
a settlement, with the EPA agreeing to make a final decision on the Program within a 
                                                
4 Id. at 677.  
5 Id. at 677-686.  
6 Tex., 690 F.3d at 676.   
7 Id. at 674-675.   
8 Id. at 676.  
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 674, 676.  
11 Id. at 676.  
12 Tex., 690 F.3d at 690.  
specified timeline.13  The EPA issued its final decision disapproving of the Program in 
2010.14    
III.  ANALYSIS 
 Texas brought this case under the judicial review provision of the Administrative 
Procedures Act. Under the Act, an agency decision must be set aside “if it is arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, or unsupported by 
substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole” or “if it is in excess of the [agency’s] 
statutory authority.”15  Using the above standard, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the EPA’s 
three main justifications for disapproving the SIP revision using this standard of review.  
A.  The Potential Major NSR Loophole 
 The EPA found that the Program, as it was written, might have “allow[ed] major 
sources to evade Major NSR” requirements because there was no express language in the 
Program limiting it to Minor NSR.16  The court held that the EPA had no authority in 
interpreting the language of a State law.  It further held that unless the EPA expressly 
demonstrated how the SIP “would interfere with any applicable requirement concerning 
attainment of NAAQS or any other applicable requirement,” it had no authority to 
disapprove of the Program.17  The court further stated the EPA’s interpretation of the law 
was incorrect because other provisions within the Program required all facilities to 
comply with all applicable requirements, and Major NSR would still go through the pre-
existing channels for approval.18  Ultimately, the court determined that in disapproving 
                                                
13 Id. at 676.   
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 676-677.  
16 Id. at 677.  
17 Id. at 677-678.  
18 Tex., 690 F.3d at 678.   
the Program based on a perceived Major NSR loophole, the EPA was merely expressing 
a preference for a certain “drafting style” and not an enforceable standard a state must 
meet under the CAA.19  Disapproval based on this criteria was therefore arbitrary and 
capricious and in excess of the EPA’s statutory authority.20  
B.  Inadequate Monitoring, Recordkeeping, and Reporting Requirements  
 The EPA’s second reason for disapproving the Program was the monitoring, 
record keeping, and recording requirements conferred “too much discretion on the TCEQ 
Director” and were “too vague and not replicable.”21  The court upheld creating the MRR 
requirements on a case-by-case basis because each applicant would be required to 
“propose a workable plan for how emissions would be measured” and “detail the 
contaminants for which a cap is desired, the sources of emissions for those contaminants, 
emissions rate calculations . . . and proposed control technology.”22  Emphasizing the 
cooperative federalism system of enforcement in the CAA, the majority reasoned Texas 
had the authority to determine control measures so long as they ensured compliance with 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”).23  Therefore, the EPA did not have 
the authority to disapprove of the revision based on the level of discretion the Director 
was given to approve a particular control measures chosen.24  
C.  The Emissions Calculations as Unclear or Non-Replicable 
 The EPA’s third basis for disapproval was that it would be “difficult to hold 
permit holders accountable for complying with their emissions cap” using the Program’s 
                                                
19 Id. at 679.  
20 Id. at 679-680.  
21 Id. at 681.  
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 682-684.  
24 Tex., 690 F.3d at 682-684.  
method for calculating emissions because they were “not sufficiently clear and 
replicable.”25  The court held that since “clarity and replicability” was not a standard 
enumerated under the CAA, the EPA acted outside of its authority and was arbitrary and 
capricious in disapproving Texas’ SIP on that basis.26 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 Throughout the opinion, the majority strongly emphasized the importance of 
maintaining the cooperative federalism balance written into the CAA.  The court was 
very careful to protect the rights of the State in implementing the CAA standards 
however state officials determined was appropriate, so long as they comply with federal 
standards.  This was particularly true for decision points where the EPA did not 
thoroughly explain how the CAA granted authority to disapprove state plans on certain 
criteria.  The outcome of this case might caution future administrators to detail more 
explicitly the statutory basis for their decisions in the event those decisions might be 
interpreted to run contrary to the CAA’s goal of cooperative federalism.    
                                                
25 Id. at 684.   
26 Id. at 686.  
